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Abstract	
Purpose	–	The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	make	sense	of	the	tensions	and	contradictions	
between	different	conceptions	of	the	meaning	of	carbon	accounting.		
Design/methodology/approach	–	The	paper	draws	on	theories	of	framing	to	help	
explain	the	divergent	understandings	and	practices	currently	encompassed	by	the	term	
‘carbon	accounting’.	The	empirical	core	of	the	paper	is	based	on	a	review	of	the	
literature	and	illustrated	through	examples	of	some	of	the	contemporary	problems	in	
carbon	accounting.		
Findings	–	Tensions	and	contradictions	in	carbon	accounting	can	be	understood	as	the	
result	of	‘collisions’	between	at	least	five	overlapping	frames	of	reference,	namely	
physical,	political,	market-enabling,	financial	and	social/environmental	modes	of	carbon	
accounting.		
Practical	implications	–	Unresolved	tensions	in	carbon	accounting	can	undermine	
confidence	in	climate	science,	policies,	markets	and	reporting,	thereby	ultimately	
discouraging	action	to	mitigate	climate	change.	Understanding	this	problem	can	
contribute	to	finding	practical	solutions.		
Originality/value	–	The	paper	makes	three	distinct	contributions	to	the	emerging	
theoretical	literature	on	carbon	accounting.	First,	it	provides	a	unique	‘unpacked’	
definition	of	carbon	accounting	that	attempts	to	represent	the	contemporary	range	of	
meanings	encompassed	by	the	term.	Second,	we	demonstrate	how	social	science	ideas	
about	framing	can	help	explain	why	definitions	and	understandings	of	carbon	accounting	
vary.	Third,	by	making	the	interactions	between	different	forms	of	carbon	accounting	
explicit	through	the	metaphor	of	colliding	frames	of	reference,	the	origins	of	some	of	the	
contemporary	intractable	issues	in	carbon	accounting	can	be	better	understood.		
Keywords	–	carbon	accounting,	framing,	commensuration,	carbon	markets,	carbon	
disclosure,	carbon,	climate	change	
Paper	type	–	research	paper		
	
	
1 Introduction	
Carbon	accounting	clearly	means	different	things	to	different	people.	To	scientists,	it	is	
“the	practice	of	making	scientifically	robust	and	verifiable	measurements	of	GHG	
[greenhouse	gas]	emissions.”	(Watson,	2009:	6).	To	political	negotiators,	it	implies	“the	
rules	for	comparing	emissions	and	removals	as	reported	with	commitments”	at	a	
national	level	(IPCC,	2005:	265).	To	practitioners	in	the	United	Nations	Clean	
Development	Mechanism	(CDM)	market,	it	involves	the	measurement	of	reductions	in	
emissions	relative	to	a	hypothetical	baseline,	and	other	processes	associated	with	the	
subsequent	creation	of	a	new	tradable	commodity:	a	carbon	credit	(Ministry	of	the	
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Environment,	Japan,	2009).	To	the	International	Accounting	Standards	Board	(IASB),	it	
concerns	the	accounting	of	tradable	emission	rights	and	obligations	arising	under	
emissions	trading	schemes	(IASB,	2008).	To	the	increasing	numbers	of	companies	
reporting	to	the	Carbon	Disclosure	Project	(CDP),	The	Climate	Registry	or	other	similar	
schemes,	it	involves	the	measurement	and	disclosure	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	for	
which	companies	accept	varying	degrees	of	responsibility	(Kolk	et	al.,	2008;	
PricewaterhouseCoopers,	2009;	WBCSD	and	WRI,	2004;	Defra,	2009b).		
	
Carbon	accounting	in	these	different	senses	has	become	an	essential	‘enabler’	of	several	
of	society’s	key	responses	to	the	problem	of	climate	change,	including	national	emission	
limitation	commitments,	corporate	climate	change	performance	targets	and	carbon	
markets.	Yet	its	role	and	contribution	is	generally	overlooked.	Furthermore,	the	
connections,	overlaps	and	discontinuities	between	different	forms	of	carbon	accounting	
have	not	received	sufficient	critical	attention:	different	manifestations	of	carbon	
accounting	each	tend	to	have	their	own	institutions,	normative	practices	and	distinctive	
discourse,	including	academic	literatures.	This	paper	takes	a	holistic	view	of	what	carbon	
accounting	means	across	disciplines	and	institutions	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	
differences	by	placing	different	forms	of	carbon	accounting	in	their	historical	and	social	
context.		
	
We	propose	that	the	contemporary	space	of	carbon	accounting	can	be	conceptualised	as	
a	collision	between	at	least	five	major	‘framing’	processes,	where	the	‘hot’	new	world	of	
political	commitments	and	carbon	markets	meets	the	comparatively	‘cooler’	bedrock	of	
physical	carbon	accounting,	financial	accounting	and	social/environmental	accounting.	
Our	core	argument	is	that	to	date	these	carbon	accounting	‘frames’	or	perspectives	have	
operated	in	relative	isolation,	and	a	better	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	
these	five	frames	could	aid	the	development	of	solutions	to	accounting-based	problems	
which	can	otherwise	hamper	climate	change	mitigation	efforts.	
	
This	account	of	the	five	frames	forms	the	empirical	core	of	the	paper.	We	show	that	an	
extensive	literature	on	physical	carbon	measurement	pre-dates	and	influences	the	more	
technical	literature	on	‘political’	accounting	of	carbon	in	national	inventories,	which	in	
turn	influences	subsequent	‘market-enabling’	carbon	accounting.	Only	in	recent	years,	as	
carbon	markets	have	begun	to	have	material	impacts	on	company	balance	sheets,	have	
financial	accountants	begun	to	address	financial	accounting	of	rights	and	obligations	in	
those	markets	(IASB,	2008;	Cook,	2009,	Lovell,	2010).	A	largely	separate	literature	
critically	examines	issues	around	corporate	carbon	disclosure	and	reporting	(see	Kolk	et	
al.,	2008),	building	on	a	much	larger	literature	on	social	and	environmental	accounting.	
Thus	far	there	is	only	a	small	(but	valuable)	amount	of	research	directly	assessing	the	
politics	and	practices	of	carbon	accounting	from	a	broader	perspective	(see	Bebbington	
and	Larrinaga-González,	2008;	Cook,	2009;	MacKenzie,	2009).	In	general,	debates	over	
carbon	accounting	have	been	taking	place	within	frames,	with	relatively	few	
interconnections.	Here,	by	bringing	together	and	critically	examining	the	different	
meanings	of	carbon	accounting,	we	hope	to	demonstrate	the	advantages	of	a	more	
holistic	assessment.	
	
The	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	First,	we	provide	a	proposed	definition	of	carbon	
accounting,	representing	the	contemporary	range	of	meanings	encompassed	by	the	
term,	which	we	believe	constitutes	a	useful	framework	within	which	various	problematic	
accounting	issues	can	be	situated	and	clearly	identified.	Second,	we	review	relevant		
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literature	from	a	range	of	social	science	disciplines	on	the	theme	of	framing	as	discursive	
practice.	Third,	we	provide	an	account	of	the	five	distinctive	framings	of	carbon	
accounting:	physical,	political,	market-enabling,	financial,	and	social/environmental	
carbon	accounting.	Within	this,	we	provide	examples	of	key	tensions	in	different	
understandings	of	carbon	accounting	that	illustrate	the	complexity	of	the	issues	under	
consideration.	In	conclusion,	we	underline	the	fact	that	unresolved	issues	in	carbon	
accounting	have	material	negative	consequences,	and	thus	an	improved	understanding	
of	the	underlying	causes	of	friction	may	contribute	to	finding	workable	solutions	to	
climate	change.	
	
2 Defining	carbon	accounting	
It	is	evident	from	the	discussion	so	far	that	providing	a	neat,	concise	definition	of	carbon	
accounting	is	somewhat	elusive	and	problematic;	this	in	fact	is	the	point	of	our	paper.	To	
begin	with,	‘carbon’	is	a	term	that	can	be	used	to	mean	several	different	things	on	its	
own:	by	scientists	in	a	strict	sense	to	refer	to	elemental	carbon;	more	popularly	to	refer	
either	to	the	principal	greenhouse	gas,	carbon	dioxide,	alone,	or	as	shorthand	for	all	
greenhouse	gases	(see	Bebbington	and	Larrinaga-González,	2008:	714,	note	1).	When	
combined	with	‘accounting’	and	viewed	through	different	frames	of	reference,	the	range	
of	possible	meanings	is	multiplied.	
	
We	believe	it	is	useful	to	understand	carbon	accounting	through	the	analogy	of	a	
jumbled	landscape	created	by	the	collisions	within	and	between	multiple	frames,	rather	
than	as	a	neatly	delineated,	essentialised	object	of	inquiry	(Callon,	1998;	Lohmann,	
2009).	Nevertheless,	it	is	also	helpful	to	have	a	summary	of	the	spectrum	of	activities	
that	carbon	accounting	can	involve	across	the	different	frames	of	reference.	Accordingly,	
we	propose	that	carbon	accounting	can	be	understood	as	the:	
	
estimation	
calculation	
measurement	
monitoring	
reporting	
validation	
verification	
auditing		
of	
carbon	
carbon	
dioxide	
greenhouse	
gas	
emissions	to	the	atmosphere	
removals	from	the	atmosphere	
emission	rights	
emission	obligations	
emission	reductions	
	
legal	or	financial	instruments	
linked	to	the	above	
trades/transactions	of	any	of	the	
above	
	
impacts	on	climate	change	
impacts	from	climate	change	
at	
global	
national	
sub-national	
regional	
civic	
organisational	
corporate	
project	
installation	
event	
product	
supply	chain	
level,	
for	
mandatory	
voluntary	
research	
compliance	
reporting	
disclosure	
benchmarking	
auditing	
information	
marketing	
or	other	
purposes	
	
By	selecting	and	combining	different	terms	within	this	table,	a	multitude	of	more	specific	
interpretations	of	carbon	accounting	may	be	derived.	Thus,	for	example,	climate	
scientists	are	chiefly	concerned	with	estimation	or	direct	measurement	of	greenhouse	
gas	emissions	and	removals	at	the	global	level,	for	research	purposes.	The	Climate	
Disclosure	Standards	Board,	on	the	other	hand,	is	interested	in	reporting	of	greenhouse	
gas	emissions	and	impacts	from	climate	change	at	the	corporate	level,	for	voluntary	
disclosure	purposes	(Climate	Disclosure	Standards	Board,	2009).	Specific	definitions,	
then,	are	like	pathways	through	the	landscape	created	by	the	collisions	between	
different	frames.	
	
Problematic	issues	may	also	be	located	within	this	landscape:	for	example,	a	‘walk’	
through	auditing	of	trades	in	financial	instruments	linked	to	carbon	dioxide	emission	
rights	at	the	corporate	level	for	mandatory	compliance	purposes	in	the	European	Union	
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(EU)	might	encounter	the	recent	issue	of	EU	Allowance	(EUA)	VAT	carousel	fraud,	
thought	to	have	resulted	in	multi-billion	euro	tax	revenue	losses	and	to	have	accounted	
for	up	to	13%	of	all	EUA	trades	in	the	first	half	of	2009	(Ainsworth,	2010;	New	Energy	
Finance,	2010).	Similarly,	a	range	of	contentious	issues	to	do	with	offsetting	and	carbon	
neutrality	can	be	found	at	the	intersection	of	several	other	pathways,	including	those	
leading	through	auditing	of	project-level	emission	reductions	(on	the	production	side)	
and	corporate-level	voluntary	reporting	for	marketing-related	purposes	(on	the	
consumption	side)	(see	for	example	Wara,	2008;	Lovell,	Bulkeley	and	Liverman,	2009).	
These	and	many	other	issues	can	be	located	within	our	deliberately	broad	definition	of	
carbon	accounting,	and	we	return	to	several	of	them	in	section	4	below.	
	
3 The	politics	of	framing	
We	believe	that	the	concept	of	framing	helps	us	understand	why	such	different	
conceptions	of	carbon	accounting	have	developed,	why	certain	issues	are	hotly	
contested	(whereas	others	are	not),	and	why	carbon	accounting	practices	frequently	fall	
short	of	expectations.	This	is	not	a	matter	of	merely	theoretical	interest:	we	believe	that	
acknowledging	and	understanding	these	different	framings	can	lead	to	more	effective	
carbon	accounting,	and	thus	to	more	effective	societal	responses	to	the	challenges	posed	
by	climate	change.	
	
At	the	most	fundamental	level,	notions	of	carbon	accounting	involve	the	construction	of	
meaning	through	discourse,	defined	by	Hajer	(1995:	44)	as	“…a	specific	ensemble	of	
ideas,	concepts	and	categorizations	that	are	produced,	reproduced	and	transformed	in	a	
particular	set	of	practices	and	through	which	meaning	is	given	to	physical	and	social	
realities."	The	‘objects’	of	carbon	accounting	must	be	created	through	discursive	acts	
which	are	fundamentally	political	in	nature	(Dryzek,	1997;	Flyvbjerg,	1998;	Hajer,	1995).	
As	such,	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	issue	is	characterised	by	continued	uncertainty	and	
ambiguity	about	both	the	nature	of	the	problem	and	its	solutions,	much	like	other	
contentious	environmental	issues	such	as	depletion	of	the	ozone	layer	or	acid	rain	(Hajer,	
1995;	Litfin,	1994).		
	
Within	the	vast	field	of	discourse	analysis	(see	Fischer	and	Forester,	1993	for	an	
overview)	we	concentrate	on	the	concept	of	framing.	Distinct	literatures	in	public	policy	
analysis	(political	science)	and	economic	sociology	use	the	concept	of	framing	(see	for	
example	Rein	and	Schon,	1993;	Callon,	1998;	Hoffman	and	Ventresca,	1999;	Laws	and	
Rein,	2003;	Lovell,	2004;	Lohmann,	2005;	Callon	and	Muniesa,	2007;	Callon,	2009).	In	the	
policy	discourse	literature,	frames	are	seen	as	a	lens	on	the	way	that	policy	problems	are	
viewed,	discussed	and	resolved:	“…a	way	of	selecting,	organising,	interpreting	and	
making	sense	of	a	complex	reality	to	provide	guideposts	for	knowing,	analysing,	
persuading	and	acting.	A	frame	is	a	perspective	from	which	an	amorphous,	ill-defined,	
problematic	situation	can	be	made	sense	of	and	acted	on.”	(Rein	and	Schon,	1993:	146).	
Similarly,	for	Callon	and	others	in	their	analysis	of	markets,	frames	allow	market	agents	
to	calculate	and	make	sense	of	a	market	by	drawing	boundaries	around	it	(Callon,	1998).	
In	both	literatures,	by	setting	boundaries	around	an	issue,	frames	act	as	a	vital	precursor	
to	further	action	(Hajer,	1995;	Kingdon,	1995;	Rein	and	Schon,	1993).	This	is	of	course	
particularly	relevant	in	situations	where	new	policy	problems	(such	as	climate	change)	
arise,	where	there	is	high	uncertainty	about	how	to	respond.	Framing	defines	the	
problem	(and	therefore	also	its	solutions)	by	structuring	the	terms	of	the	debate,	
foregrounding	certain	forms	of	knowledge,	expertise	and	practice	as	relevant,	and		
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setting	limits	on	what	action	is	judged	to	be	appropriate.	Framing	is	used	to	make	sense	
of	the	world,	and	then	actively	affects	our	response.		
	
One	function	of	these	discursive	boundaries	is	to	make	sense	of	an	amorphous	reality;	
another	is	to	claim	ownership.	Particular	groups	of	people	involved	in	the	policy	process	
frame	an	issue	in	ways	that	make	it	understandable	and	solvable	to	them	–	fitting	their	
beliefs,	values,	knowledge	and	professional	expertise	(Power,	1991;	1997).	This	can	lead	
to	a	struggle	for	ownership	with	other	communities	that	have	come	together	to	frame	
the	issue	in	their	own	way:	for	Hajer	and	others	(Hajer	and	Versteeg,	2005;	Hajer,	1995;	
Litfin,	1994;	Lovell,	2004;	Lovell	et	al.,	2009b)	it	is	precisely	this	competition	between	
discourses	that	drives	policy	change,	therefore	making	it	a	valuable	field	of	study.		
	
A	third	feature	of	framing	is	that	it	is	inevitably	incomplete.	As	Callon	(2009:	7)	observes	
specifically	in	relation	to	carbon	markets:	
	
“At	the	heart	of	markets	we	find	debates,	issues,	feelings,	matters	of	concern,	
dissatisfaction,	regrets,	and	plans	to	alter	existing	rules,	which	cannot	be	internalized	
once	and	for	all	because	they	are	linked	to	irreducible	uncertainties,	to	what	I	have	
called	framings	which	are	never	either	definitive	or	unquestionable.	This	‘hot’	
component	of	markets…	always	exists.”		
		
While	Callon	and	others	concentrate	on	the	ways	in	which	frames	deconstruct	
themselves	via	‘entanglements’	and	‘overflows’	(Callon,	1998;	Lohmann,	2009),	we	feel	
there	is	another	level	of	interaction	also	taking	place	here,	which	we	characterise	as	
‘collisions’	between	different	frames	(Lovell	and	Smith,	2010).	In	recognising	the	
interactions	between	separate	frames	we	build	upon	Rein	and	Schon’s	(1993)	distinction	
between	policy	disagreements	and	policy	controversies:	disagreements	occur	within	the	
same	frame,	controversies	are	between	different	frames,	and	thus	are	much	more	
difficult	to	resolve.		
	
Finally,	a	notable	feature	of	frames	is	that,	much	like	systems	of	measurement,	
classification	and	commensuration	more	generally	(Espeland	and	Stevens,	1998;	Bowker	
and	Star,	2000;	Alonso	and	Starr,	1984;	Robson,	1992;	MacKenzie,	2006;	Latour,	1999),	
they	are	seldom	acknowledged	and	often	invisible	to	those	using	them:	
	
“Although	frames	exert	a	powerful	influence	on	what	we	see	and	neglect,	and	how	
we	interpret	what	we	see,	they	are,	paradoxically,	difficult	to	assess.	Because	they	
are	part	of	the	natural,	taken-for-granted	world,	we	are	often	unaware	of	their	role	
in	organising	our	preconceptions,	thoughts	and	actions.”	(Rein	and	Schon,	1993:	
151).	
	
By	explicitly	acknowledging	and	highlighting	the	framing	of	carbon	accounting	by	
different	communities	of	practice,	we	believe	there	are	significant	opportunities	to	
encourage	constructive	learning	and	policy	change	(what	Rein	and	Schon	term	‘frame-
reflective	discourse’;	see	Etzion	and	Ferraro,	2010	for	an	example)	–	a	point	we	return	to	
in	our	conclusions.		
	
4 The	multiple	frames	of	carbon	accounting	
Over	time,	a	range	of	actors	and	disciplines	have	attempted	to	measure	‘carbon’	and	its	
impacts	in	various	ways,	for	a	number	of	different	reasons.	We	identify	five	major	
framings	of	carbon	accounting,	involving	actors	as	diverse	as	scientists,	politicians,	
economists,	accountants	and	activists.	We	will	show	that	three	of	these	–	physical,	
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political	and	market-enabling	carbon	accounting	–	are	closely	related	to	one	another,	
developing	in	sequence	and	each	relying	on	the	earlier	frame.	The	fourth,	financial	
carbon	accounting,	also	follows	in	roughly	temporal	sequence	as	a	consequence	of	
market-enabling	carbon	accounting,	but	has	very	different	origins	and	objectives,	and	is	
largely	blind	to	the	earlier	frames.	By	contrast,	the	fifth	frame	of	social/environmental	
carbon	accounting	has	a	longer	pedigree	which	runs	alongside	the	other	frames,	
sometimes	interacting,	but	with	its	own	specific	origins	and	objectives.		
	
These	five	frames	are	not	exclusive	of	other	framings,	and	no	doubt	each	can	be	
critiqued	from	a	variety	of	further	perspectives.	Nor	can	we	hope	to	provide	an	
exhaustive	summary	of	the	literature	in	relation	to	any	individual	frame.	Rather,	we	aim	
to	provide	sufficient	evidence	to	demonstrate	that	such	framings	exist,	and	to	point	to	
some	of	the	key	institutions,	actors	and	social	context	which	make	up	each	of	the	
identified	frames.	
4.1 Physical	carbon	accounting	
The	first	of	our	frames	can	be	characterised	as	the	natural	sciences	view	of	carbon	
accounting	as	a	matter	of	physical	measurement,	estimation	or	calculation	and	
attribution	of	greenhouse	gas	fluxes	through	the	biophysical	environment.	It	has	a	long	
history:	the	first	quantitative	account	of	the	global	carbon	cycle,	including	an	estimate	of	
the	human-induced	contribution	from	combustion	of	fossil	fuels,	was	given	by	the	
Swedish	geologist	Arvid	Högbom	in	1895,	and	later	used	by	his	chemist	colleague	Svante	
Arrhenius	to	postulate	the	theory	that	the	latter	activity	could	cause	long-term	warming	
of	the	global	climate,	in	a	seminal	1896	paper	(Högbom,	1895;	Arrhenius,	1896;	Rodhe,	
Charlson	and	Crawford,	1997).	Although	Arrhenius	was	only	aware	of	two	greenhouse	
gases	at	the	time	(carbon	dioxide	and	water	vapour)	his	estimate	of	the	potential	
warming	associated	with	a	doubling	of	greenhouse	gas	concentrations	in	the	atmosphere	
(5.7°C)	was	surprisingly	close	to	modern-day	estimates	(Arrhenius,	1896;	c.f.	IPCC,	
2007a).	However,	he	believed	that	such	an	outcome	would	not	eventuate	for	many	
thousands	of	years,	based	on	Högbom’s	data	on	contemporary	emission	rates.	As	long	as	
the	implications	of	carbon	accounting	were	believed	to	be	benign	or	at	worst	remote,	it	
remained	a	topic	primarily	of	interest	to	geologists	and	atmospheric	chemists	seeking	to	
understand	natural	processes	such	as	the	causes	of	past	ice	ages.	
	
However,	by	the	1960s,	increasingly	accurate	instrumental	measurements	of	
atmospheric	carbon	dioxide	levels	being	made	at	the	Mauna	Loa	observatory	confirmed	
that	concentrations	were	indeed	higher	than	pre-industrial	levels,	and	rising	(Pales	and	
Keeling,	1965).	By	the	1980s,	scientific	concern	about	human-induced	global	warming	
had	well	and	truly	‘overflowed’	the	purely	scientific	frame	to	become	a	subject	of	intense	
political	and	economic	debate.	This	debate	took	place	at	multiple	levels,	the	most	
significant	of	which	was	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly,	where	a	number	of	
resolutions	led	eventually	to	UN	General	Assembly	Resolution	45/212	in	1990,	which	
initiated	negotiations	that	concluded	in	the	adoption	of	the	UN	Framework	Convention	
on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC)	at	the	Rio	Earth	Summit	in	1992.1	This	can	be	seen	as	the	
founding	moment	for	our	second	frame	of	reference,	political	carbon	accounting.	
	
Physical	carbon	accounting	of	course	continues	to	be	the	primary	frame	of	reference	on	
carbon	accounting	for	thousands	of	climate	scientists	worldwide	(for	a	broad	synthesis	of	
the	literature	see	Chapter	2	in	IPCC,	2007b).	Nevertheless,	it	is	increasingly	difficult,	if	not	
impossible,	to	maintain	separation	between	the	science	and	the	politics	of	climate	
change,	as	recently	demonstrated	by	the	furore	generated	over	leaked	emails	from	the	
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University	of	East	Anglia’s	Climatic	Research	Unit	(CRU)	in	the	lead-up	to	the	Copenhagen	
climate	change	summit	in	late	2009	(Biello,	2010).	
	
With	the	exception	of	financial	carbon	accounting,	all	of	the	other	framings	look	to	
physical	carbon	accounting	for	fundamental	principles.	Tensions	and	inconsistencies	
arise	for	two	main	reasons.	First,	non-scientists	can	be	frustrated	by	the	inability	of	
science	to	give	definitive	answers	in	certain	areas,	such	as	the	magnitude	of	non-carbon	
dioxide	impacts	from	air	travel,	which	has	led	to	wide	divergence	in	estimates	of	air	
travel	offset	requirements	(see	Padgett	et	al.,	2008;	Defra,	2009a).	Second,	the	
provisional,	evolving	nature	of	the	science	poses	a	challenge	for	other	forms	of	carbon	
accounting	which	seek	to	arrive	at	final	conclusions	with	fixed	consequences,	several	
examples	of	which	we	provide	in	discussion	of	the	other	framings	of	carbon	accounting.	
	
4.2 Political	carbon	accounting	
The	new	political	framing	of	climate	change	represented	by	the	UNFCCC	required	a	
corresponding	re-framing	of	physical	carbon	accounting	to	suit	an	array	of	new	
objectives,	including	the	attribution	of	“common	but	differentiated	responsibilities”	
(UNFCCC	Article	3.1)	–	words	entailing	significant	economic	consequences.	The	
Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC),	which	was	established	in	1988	as	the	
scientific	and	technical	advisory	body	to	the	ongoing	climate	negotiations,	played	a	key	
role	in	this	re-framing	process	(Fogel,	2005).	The	IPCC	is	a	classic	example	of	a	“boundary	
organization”	that	links	and	mediates	between	scientific	and	policy	institutions	and	
actors	(Jasanoff,	Markle	et	al.,	1995;	Guston,	2000).	In	fact	it	produces	explicitly	“hybrid”	
knowledge	that	is	neither	purely	scientific	nor	purely	political,	but	both:	the	major	IPCC	
reports	comprise	both	a	summary	of	the	scientific	literature	prepared	by	a	committee	of	
scientists,	and	a	summary	for	policy-makers	which	is	only	finalised	in	the	highly	charged	
political	arena	of	a	UNFCCC	plenary	to	which	all	states	are	invited	(Miller,	2001;	Fogel,	
2005).		
	
The	UNFCCC	made	carbon	accounting	at	the	national	level	mandatory	for	all	signatories	
(“Parties”).	Article	4.1	(a)	requires	all	Parties	to	“Develop,	periodically	update,	publish	
and	make	available…	national	inventories	of	anthropogenic	emissions	by	sources	and	
removals	by	sinks	of	all	greenhouse	gases	not	controlled	by	the	Montreal	Protocol,	using	
comparable	methodologies	to	be	agreed	upon	by	the	Conference	of	Parties…”	(United	
Nations,	1992).	The	IPCC	was	charged	with	developing	the	necessary	“comparable	
methodologies”.	The	first	IPCC	Guidelines	for	National	Greenhouse	Gas	Inventories	were	
duly	produced	in	1995,	and	soon	replaced	by	the	Revised	1996	Guidelines	for	National	
Greenhouse	Gas	Inventories	(IPCC,	1996).	Use	of	the	Revised	1996	Guidelines	was	
subsequently	mandated	for	national	carbon	accounting	under	both	the	UNFCCC	and	its	
subsidiary	instrument,	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	in	1997.2		
	
As	Miller	(2001:	489)	observes:		
	
“Measures	of	national	emissions	of	greenhouse	gases	have	become	the	accepted	
means	within	the	climate	regime	for	assigning	blame	for	changes	in	the	climate	and	
therefore	for	assigning	responsibility	for	undertaking	action	to	help	stabilize	the	
atmosphere.	Such	measures	thus	have	enormously	high	political	significance	within	
the	regime…”		
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The	role	of	boundary	organisations	such	as	the	IPCC	is	to	come	up	with	both	the	
normative	and	technical	judgements	required	to	produce	standardised	and	politically	
acceptable	carbon	accounting	rules,	methodologies	and	procedures	(Miller,	2001).	Thus	
the	political	framing	of	carbon	accounting	takes	a	step	away	from	the	scientific	mode	of	
measurement,	calculation	and	estimation	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	at	the	global	
level,	towards	a	function	of	monitoring	and	reporting	at	the	national	level.	Political	
expediency	dictates	the	scope	of	national	inventories:	emissions	which	cannot	be	
attributed	to	human	activities,	emissions	of	greenhouse	gases	already	controlled	by	the	
Montreal	Protocol,	and	emissions	associated	with	international	air	and	maritime	
transport	are	all	excluded	(IPCC,	1996).	The	need	for	standardised	methodologies	to	
enable	comparisons	between	countries	and	over	time	creates	the	potential	for	conflict	
with	the	provisional	and	ever-evolving	nature	of	the	science.		
	
An	apt	illustration	of	such	a	conflict	concerns	the	use	of	conversion	factors	to	evaluate	
the	net	impact	of	different	greenhouse	gases	(GHGs),	each	with	their	own	unique	
atmospheric	chemistry	and	contribution	to	global	warming	(Mackenzie,	2009;	IPCC,	
2007b;	Plattner	et	al.,	2009).	Climate	scientists	have	formulated	various	ways	of	
measuring	and	commensurating	the	climate	impacts	of	different	GHGs,	the	most	
influential	of	these	being	Lashof	and	Ahuja	(1990),	who	developed	the	theoretical	
framework	for	what	is	now	known	as	‘global	warming	potential’	(GWP)	–	a	metric	of	the	
contribution	to	global	warming	of	a	given	mass	of	GHG	over	a	given	time	horizon,	all	
conveniently	expressed	in	multiples	of	carbon	dioxide	equivalent.		
	
The	driver	for	development	of	this	index	was	both	political	and	economic:	as	Lashof	and	
Ahuja	note,	“An	index	to	compare	the	contribution	of	various	‘greenhouse’	gas	emissions	
to	global	warming	is	needed	to	develop	cost-effective	strategies	for	limiting	this	
warming.”	(1990:	529).	In	addition	to	being	only	one	of	several	possible	approaches	(for	
others	see	Plattner	et	al.,	2009)	the	approach	is	beset	with	uncertainties,	both	empirical	
(e.g.	uncertainty	in	observations	of	atmospheric	residence	times)	and	theoretical	(e.g.	
results	being	sensitive	to	the	choice	of	time	horizon).	However,	in	1997,	Article	5.3	of	the	
Kyoto	Protocol	mandated	the	use	of	an	arbitrary	set	of	global	warming	potentials	(those	
published	in	1996	by	the	IPCC	in	its	Second	Assessment	Report)	for	the	purposes	of	
national	carbon	accounting	over	the	first	commitment	period	(2008-2012).		
	
This	political	choice	has	given	rise	to	divergences	between	physical	and	political	carbon	
accounting.	Estimates	of	the	GWP	of	various	GHGs	published	in	the	scientific	literature,	
and	summarised	by	the	IPCC	in	subsequent	assessment	reports,	continue	to	be	revised,	
whereas	the	factors	now	used	in	reporting	under	the	UNFCCC	and	Kyoto	Protocol	–	and	
in	a	wide	range	of	national	and	corporate	reporting	standards	developed	since	then	–	
have	remained	static	(UNFCCC,	2006;	2008).	The	UK’s	national	emissions,	for	example,	
are	calculated	using	the	1996	GWP	‘exchange	rate’	for	methane	of	21	times	the	
equivalent	mass	of	carbon	dioxide,	whereas	the	latest	IPCC	assessment	report	suggests	
that	a	value	of	25	times	is	more	accurate	–	a	variation	of	nearly	20%	(Defra,	2006;	IPCC,	
2007b:	212).	If	measured	over	a	20-year	time	horizon	rather	than	the	conventional	100	
years,	the	latest	GWP	of	methane	rises	to	72	(IPCC,	2007b).	These	alternatives	have	
major	implications	for	where	governments	should	direct	their	climate	mitigation	efforts,	
yet	the	political	decisions	are	fundamentally	arbitrary	from	a	scientific	perspective.	As		
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Milne	et	al.	put	it,	after	reviewing	the	wild	fluctuations	in	estimates	of	New	Zealand’s	
national	inventory	from	2005	to	2009:	“GHG	emission	accounting,	like	much	other	
accounting,	is	set	to	remain	part	science,	part	modelling,	part	guesswork	and	part	
negotiation”	(2010:	27).	
4.3 Market-enabling	carbon	accounting	
In	the	1990s,	relying	in	part	on	the	use	of	global	warming	potentials	to	enable	the	
commensuration	of	different	GHGs	emitted	in	different	places	at	different	times,	
economists	such	as	Nordhaus	began	to	frame	climate	change	as	essentially	an	optimal	
control	problem,	the	ideal	policy	solution	to	which	would	lie	at	the	point	where	marginal	
abatement	costs	would	equal	the	marginal	damages	caused	by	climate	change	(1991:	
924).	From	here	it	was	a	small	–	yet	momentous	–	step	to	postulate	that	a	market	for	
abatement	of	greenhouse	gases	would	be	more	likely	to	arrive	at	this	optimal	solution	
than	even	the	most	well-meant	policy-making.	The	USA	had	experimented	with	a	market	
approach	to	regulating	sulphur	dioxide	emissions	since	the	early	1990s,	with	great	
apparent	success,	in	terms	of	breaking	the	policy-making	impasse,	reducing	emissions	at	
lower	than	expected	cost,	and	fostering	innovation	(Wambsganss	and	Sanford,	1996;	
Johnston	et	al.,	2008;	MacKenzie,	2009).	Largely	at	the	insistence	of	the	United	States,	
the	individual	caps	on	developed	countries’	greenhouse	gas	emissions	in	the	Kyoto	
Protocol	were	linked	by	the	three	‘flexibility	mechanisms’	of	International	Emissions	
Trading,	Joint	Implementation	and	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM),	together	
creating	a	framework	for	a	global	market	in	greenhouse	gas	emission	rights,	driven	by	
emission	obligations	(United	Nations,	1998).		
	
Discrepancies	immediately	arose	between	the	political	carbon	accounting	of	the	UNFCCC	
and	the	market-enabling	carbon	accounting	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	Creating	the	demand	
and	supply	necessary	for	a	market	in	something	as	intangible	as	GHG	emission	rights	and	
obligations	implies	numerous	acts	of	quantification,	measurement	and	commensuration	
(Espeland	and	Stevens,	1998;	Lohmann,	2005;	Mackenzie,	2009;	Lohmann,	2009).	On	the	
one	hand,	demand	was	created	by	placing	caps	on	national	emissions	from	developed	
countries,	which	naturally	looked	to	existing	IPCC	methodologies	developed	for	the	
purposes	of	measuring	national	emissions	in	a	consistent	manner,	as	discussed	above.	
On	the	other	hand,	supply	was	created	in	two	different	ways:	firstly,	by	creating	emission	
rights	and	enabling	trading	between	capped	countries	facing	different	costs	of	
compliance,	and	secondly,	by	creating	an	entirely	new,	fictitious	commodity	in	the	form	
of	an	emission	right	based	on	an	emission	reduction	achieved	in	a	country	without	a	cap	
(this	being	the	function	of	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism).		
	
Under	the	UNFCCC,	developing	countries	have	an	obligation	to	account	for	their	national	
emissions,	but	without	any	associated	or	implied	responsibility	(under	the	principle	of	
“common	but	differentiated	responsibilities”).	With	the	introduction	of	the	Kyoto	
Protocol’s	CDM,	entirely	new	carbon	accounting	rules	were	required	to	enable	the	
measurement	of	emission	reductions	against	a	hypothetical	baseline	within	defined	
projects,	whereas	previous	accounting	rules	concerned	the	measurement	of	emissions	
and	removals	taking	place	within	national	boundaries.	Such	emission	reductions	give	rise	
to	credits	known	as	Certified	Emission	Reductions	(CERs);	a	developed	country	may		
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obtain	such	CERs	and	use	them	to	exceed	its	cap	by	one	tonne	of	carbon	dioxide	(or	its	
equivalent	in	other	GHGs)	per	CER.	
	
Thus	the	CDM	is	engaged	in	an	entirely	novel	project	of	‘making	things	the	same’	
(MacKenzie,	2009):	in	this	case,	making	reductions	in	emissions	against	a	baseline	
equivalent	to	emission	rights	in	developed	countries.	The	Kyoto	Protocol	created	a	
mandate	for	this	but	did	not	specify	how	it	would	work;	more	detailed	rules	were	not	
agreed	at	the	political	level	until	2001	and	the	practical	framework	continues	to	evolve,	
with	the	full	‘rulebook’	now	running	to	over	1,000	pages.3	Methodologies	for	measuring	
emission	reductions	against	a	hypothetical	baseline	simply	did	not	exist	and	had	to	be	
invented	–	significantly,	in	this	case	not	by	scientists	or	politicians,	but	by	a	range	of	non-
state,	largely	private	sector	actors	involved	in	CDM	project	development,	via	a	bottom-
up	process	of	methodology	proposal,	review	and	rejection	or	acceptance	by	the	CDM	
Executive	Board	(for	a	discussion	of	some	of	the	non-state	actors	involved,	see	Lovell,	
Bulkeley	and	Liverman,	2009).	There	are	now	literally	hundreds	of	CDM	methodologies	
available	for	different	types	of	project.4	The	process	has	been	criticised	for	failing	to	take	
the	necessary	political	decisions	to	resolve	contentious	issues,	and	for	producing	
outcomes	riddled	with	inconsistencies	(Michaelowa	et	al.,	2007).		
	
One	of	the	most	contentious	areas	of	carbon	accounting	over	the	past	two	decades	has	
been	the	treatment	of	stored	carbon,	known	in	UNFCCC	parlance	as	‘sinks’.	Examples	of	
sinks	include	carbon	stored	in	forests	(Watson,	2009),	forest	products	(Lim	et	al.,	1999),	
soils	(Shackley	and	Sohi,	2010),	or	deep	underground,	for	example	through	carbon	
capture	and	geological	storage	(CCS)	(IPCC,	2005;	Grönkvist	et	al.,	2006).	Negotiators	of	
the	Kyoto	Protocol	in	1997	were	unable	to	decide	whether	to	allow	the	CDM	to	provide	
carbon	credits	to	projects	that	reduce	deforestation,	thereby	maintaining	forest	carbon	
sinks	that	would	otherwise	be	lost.	The	IPCC	was	commissioned	to	prepare	a	Special	
Report	on	Land	Use,	Land	Use	Change	and	Forestry	(LULUCF),	which	highlighted	the	
many	technical	difficulties	associated	with	measuring	reductions	in	deforestation,	
although	not	without	considerable	dispute	between	participants:	one	observer	relates	
the	stories	of	numerous	“boundary	battles”	taking	place	within	the	IPCC	Special	Report	
plenary	over	the	issue	(Fogel,	2005:	200).	When	more	detailed	rules	on	the	CDM	were	
finally	agreed	in	Marrakesh	in	2001,	eligible	activities	in	the	LULUCF	sector	were	limited	
to	afforestation	and	reforestation,	excluding	reduced	deforestation.	Nine	years	later,	
reduced	deforestation	is	still	excluded	from	carbon	markets	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	
although	it	is	on	the	agenda	for	a	post-2012	climate	agreement,	under	the	new	guise	of	
‘REDD’	(Reducing	Emissions	from	Deforestation	and	forest	Degradation).5	Reduced	
deforestation	remains	a	hotly	contested	area	in	market-enabling	carbon	accounting;	one	
where	the	collisions	between	the	scientific,	political	and	market-enabling	frames	have	
not	yet	been	resolved,	particularly	in	relation	to	issues	such	as	accounting	for	the	non-
permanence	of	forest	carbon	stocks	(Neeff	and	Ascui,	2009;	Eliasch,	2008).	
4.4 Financial	carbon	accounting	
The	Kyoto	Protocol	created	new	GHG	emission	rights	and	obligations	on	states,	not	
corporations.	In	many	jurisdictions,	however,	states	have	created	mirroring	rights	and	
obligations	on	corporations,	particularly	the	owners	or	operators	of	large	point	sources	
of	emissions	such	as	power	stations	and	industrial	facilities,	through	the	implementation		
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of	national	or	regional	emissions	trading	schemes.	Most	notable	of	these	has	been	the	
European	Union	Emissions	Trading	Scheme	(EU	ETS),	to	date	still	the	largest	carbon	
market	in	the	world,	with	transaction	volumes	reaching	$118	billion	in	2009	(Kossoy	and	
Ambrosi,	2010;	New	Energy	Finance,	2010).	Companies	operating	in	these	carbon	
markets	have	new	liabilities,	assets	and	financial	flows	to	account	for	in	their	financial	
reports.	However,	doing	so	has	proven	difficult,	due	to	conflicts	which	we	believe	can	be	
characterised	as	the	collision	between	a	new	attempt	at	framing	carbon	in	terms	of	
existing	financial	accounting	concepts,	and	the	incumbent	framing	in	already-existing	
carbon	markets.		
	
The	International	Accounting	Standards	Board	(IASB)	requested	its	International	Financial	
Reporting	Interpretations	Committee	(IFRIC)	to	provide	guidance	on	the	accounting	
treatment	of	emission	rights	and	obligations,	which	was	duly	issued	by	the	IASB	in	
December	2004	as	IFRIC	Interpretation	3:	Emission	Rights	(IFRIC-3),	just	before	the	1	
January	2005	start	of	the	first	phase	of	the	EU	ETS.	However,	the	guidance	was	
withdrawn	in	June	2005	after	concerns	were	raised	about	various	inconsistencies,	only	
six	months	after	it	had	been	issued	(Cook,	2009).	Since	the	withdrawal	of	IFRIC-3,	there	
has	been	no	international	guidance	on	how	to	account	for	EU	ETS	rights	and	obligations	
and	a	diversity	of	accounting	practices	has	emerged	(PricewaterhouseCoopers	and	IETA,	
2007;	Cook,	2009;	MacKenzie,	2009;	McGready,	2008).	The	issues	raised	in	relation	to	
accounting	for	emission	allowances	or	permits,	particularly	when	they	are	gifted	by	the	
state,	echo	an	earlier	debate	over	financial	accounting	of	sulphur	dioxide	permits	in	the	
USA	(see	Wambsganss	and	Sanford,	1996;	critiqued	in	Milne,	1996;	see	also	Grinnell	and	
Hunt,	2002).	However,	a	crucial	difference	now	is	that	carbon	trading	schemes	are	multi-
national	in	scope,	implying	a	need	for	global	convergence	on	financial	carbon	accounting,	
which	was	not	necessary	for	the	case	of	sulphur	dioxide	permits.	
	
Thus	far,	however,	progress	towards	a	global	standard	for	financial	carbon	accounting	
has	been	slow.	In	2008,	the	Emissions	Trading	Schemes	project	was	re-launched	by	the	
International	Accounting	Standards	Board	(IASB)	in	conjunction	with	the	US	Financial	
Accounting	Standards	Board	(FASB)	(IASB	2008).	The	IASB’s	new	work	on	carbon	
accounting	addresses	the	accounting	of	all	tradable	emissions	rights	and	obligations	
arising	under	emissions	trading	schemes,	as	well	as	the	accounting	of	activities	
undertaken	in	contemplation	of	receiving	tradable	rights	in	future	periods,	e.g.	Certified	
Emission	Reductions	(CERs)	under	the	CDM.	It	is	evident	that	carbon	sits	between	and	
challenges	a	number	of	existing	financial	accounting	standards,	including	IAS	20	
(government	grants),	IAS	38	(intangible	assets)	and	IAS	39	(financial	instruments),	and	
steps	are	currently	being	taken	to	resolve	this	ambiguous	situation,	principally	by	the	
IASB/FASB	as	well	as	individual	accountancy	firms	(see	KPMG,	2008).	Scholars	have	
interpreted	this	ambiguity	in	accounting	rules	as	illustrative	of	a	more	fundamental	lack	
of	consensus	about	the	accounting	treatment	of	carbon	(Cook,	2009;	MacKenzie,	2009).	
	
Carbon	has	been	difficult	to	classify	in	part	because	accountants	and	accounting	
standard-setters	lack	a	full	appreciation	of	the	‘production	process’	of	carbon	credits:	the	
science,	politics	and	market-enabling	rules	involved	in	turning	greenhouse	gas	emissions,	
and	emission	reductions,	into	tradable	commodities	(Lovell,	2010).	A	lack	of	knowledge	
and	experience	can	be	expected	to	reduce	over	time,	but	a	more	fundamental	challenge	
is	the	way	in	which	types	of	knowledge	and	information	are	framed	by	accountants	as		
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relevant	to	their	decision	making.	Accountants	typically	seek	to	understand	carbon	by	
comparison	with	existing,	more	familiar,	accounting	entities	such	as	taxes,	leases,	
subsidies	and	commodities,	without	appreciating	the	complexities	caused	by	changes	in	
climate	policy	or	regulation,	such	as	the	shift	to	increased	auctioning	of	carbon	
allowances	from	2013	in	the	EU	ETS,	which	to	date	has	not	received	significant	coverage	
in	technical	IASB-FASB	Board	discussions,	despite	its	importance	(ibid).	When	project	
managers	on	the	IASB-FASB	emissions	trading	scheme	project	were	interviewed	about	
the	reasons	for	the	delay	in	publication	of	an	Exposure	Draft	(from	2009	to	2010	–	see	
IASB,	2008),	it	became	clear	that,	in	their	view,	it	was	not	related	to	key	political	
developments	such	as	the	outcomes	of	the	Copenhagen	climate	change	summit	in	
December	2009	or	uncertainty	about	the	launch	of	a	US-wide	emission	trading	scheme	
(Lovell,	2010).	Indeed,	their	puzzled	response	to	this	line	of	questioning	made	it	apparent	
that	these	climate	change	policy	issues	were	outside	their	frame	of	reference.6	We	
predict	that	financial	accounting	for	carbon	will	remain	contentious	for	many	years	to	
come,	due	to	these	fundamental	conflicts	between	frames.	
4.5 Social/environmental	carbon	accounting	
The	last	of	our	five	frames	emerges	from	the	broader	context	of	social	and	
environmental	accounting,	which	has	developed	as	a	rich	and	diverse	arena	for	practice	
and	research	over	the	past	four	decades	(see	Mathews,	1997;	Gray	et	al.,	1993;	Unerman	
et	al.,	2007;	Gray,	2002;	Parker,	2005;	Owen,	2008).	It	is	clear	from	these	reviews	that	
social	and	environmental	accounting,	like	carbon	accounting,	means	different	things	to	
different	people.	Indeed,	there	are	close	parallels	between	what	we	observe	in	carbon	
accounting	today	and	an	early	description	by	Mathews	of	the	social	accounting	field:		
	
“...the	extension	of	social	accounting	measurements	and	disclosures	is	affected	by	
confusion,	measurement	problems	and	disagreements	about	the	legitimacy	of	
accounting	activity	in	this	field.	The	confusion	arises	because	the	term	social	
accounting	is	used	in	different	ways	by	different	groups	of	people	and	the	
measurement	difficulties	are	always	present	in	any	new	area;	indeed,	they	are	what	
accounting	is	all	about.”	(1984:	200)	
	
While	there	are	many	aspects	of	social/environmental	reporting	practice	that	have	
contributed	to	contemporary	carbon	accounting,	Gray	et	al.	(2007:	17)	note	“the	almost	
complete	absence”	of	carbon	accounting	in	the	social	accounting	literature	(however,	
important	contributions	have	been	made	since	then,	for	example	Bebbington	and	
Larrinaga-González,	2008).	We	focus	here	on	two	traditions	of	particular	interest:	
corporate	sustainability	reporting	and	product	Life	Cycle	Analysis	(LCA).	
	
Corporate	sustainability	reporting	has	long	been	the	most	prominent	area	of	practice	
and	research	in	social	and	environmental	accounting:	termed	“Social	Responsibility	
Accounting”	in	Mathews’	early	classification	of	the	field	and	defined	then	as	“Voluntary	
disclosure	of	information,	both	qualitative	and	quantitative,	made	by	organisations	to	
inform	or	influence	a	range	of	audiences”	(Mathews,	1984:	204).	Corporate	sustainability	
reporting	can	be	seen	as	an	extension	of	traditional	financial	reporting	to	include	social	
and	environmental	policies	and	impacts,	influenced	since	the	late	1990s	by	the	notion	of	
the	‘triple	bottom	line’	(Milne	and	Gray,	2007;	Milne	et	al.,	2008;	Milne	et	al,	2009).		
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Energy	use	and	greenhouse	gas	emission	statistics	appeared	in	some	of	the	earliest	of	
these	sustainability	reports	and	are	now	routinely	included	as	core	environmental	
indicators	under	the	Global	Reporting	Initiative	(GRI).	However,	they	constitute	only	a	
handful	of	the	dozens	of	GRI	core	indicators:	in	this	tradition,	climate	change	is	only	one	
amongst	many	social	and	environmental	impacts.	
	
Climate-change-specific	corporate	reporting	can	be	seen	as	an	extension	from	this.	A	
significant	‘enabler’	was	the	development	of	the	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol	corporate	
accounting	and	reporting	standard	by	the	World	Resources	Institute	and	the	World	
Business	Council	for	Sustainable	Development	(WBCSD	and	WRI,	2004).	While	based	in	
part	on	IPCC	guidelines	(i.e.	political	carbon	accounting),	the	GHG	Protocol	introduces	
entirely	new	concepts	relevant	only	to	corporate	emissions,	such	as	a	division	between	
three	scopes	of	direct	(Scope	1),	electricity-	and	heat-related	indirect	(Scope	2)	and	other	
indirect	(Scope	3)	emissions	(ibid).	Since	first	publication	in	2001,	the	GHG	Protocol	has	
been	incorporated	into	dozens	of	voluntary	and	governmental	reporting	guidelines,	
including	the	GRI	and	an	international	standard	(ISO14064-1).	However,	as	noted	by	Kolk	
et	al.	(2008:	738),	the	appearance	this	gives	of	standardisation	is	misleading:	many	of	the	
‘derived’	guidelines	modify	or	supplement	the	GHG	Protocol	in	unique	ways	(see	for	
example	Defra,	2009b),	leading	to	inconsistencies	in	global	corporate	reporting.		
	
A	second	major	development	in	climate-change-specific	corporate	reporting	was	the	
establishment	of	the	Carbon	Disclosure	Project	(CDP)	in	2000.	In	2002,	backed	by	a	group	
of	35	signatory	investors	with	US$4.5	trillion	in	assets,	the	CDP	issued	a	call	to	FT500	
Global	Index	companies	for	information	relating	to	their	impacts	on	and	from	climate	
change	(Innovest,	2003).	By	2009,	the	CDP	was	proudly	acting	“On	behalf	of	475	
investors	with	assets	of	US	$55	trillion”	(PricewaterhouseCoopers,	2009).	Carbon	
disclosure	appears	to	be	going	‘mainstream’	even	faster	than	its	corporate	sustainability	
‘parent’:	while	the	number	of	companies	registering	GRI	reports	reached	1,000	for	the	
first	time	in	2008,	the	same	milestone	was	reached	in	terms	of	companies	responding	to	
the	CDP	in	2007,	and	by	2009,	the	number	of	CDP	reports	(2,456)	was	nearly	double	the	
GRI	level.7	The	comparison	may	be	a	little	unfair,	because	a	CDP	‘response’	is	not	
necessarily	complete,	nor	necessarily	made	public;	while	the	number	of	companies	
producing	reports	based	on	GRI	guidance	is	undoubtedly	much	higher	than	the	number	
registering	these	reports	with	GRI.8	Nevertheless,	the	growth	in	carbon	disclosure,	
particularly	since	2006	through	the	CDP,	has	been	astounding.	The	resulting	data	
provides	a	rich	basis	for	research	into	the	relationships	between	disclosure,	management	
strategies	and	various	measures	of	performance	–	even	if	a	preliminary	analysis	by	Kolk	
et	al.	suggests	that	“...in	spite	of	increasing	response	rates	and	expanding	volume	of	the	
answers,	there	is	no	real	evidence	that	the	information	is	helpful	and	is	being	used	by	
investors	in	their	decision-making	processes”	(2008:	741).	It	also	provides	a	basis	for	
emergent	forms	of	carbon	benchmarking	(Mackenzie	et	al.,	2009;	Czyz	et	al.,	2010).		
	
Kolk	et	al.	note	a	number	of	factors	that	have	played	a	part	in	the	rapid	
institutionalisation	of	carbon	disclosure,	including	“the	convergence	of	business,	
governments,	NGOs	and	key	academic	and	professional	constituencies	around	a	
somewhat	fragmented,	decentralized	and	market-oriented	mode	of	carbon	governance”		
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(2008:	722)	–	namely,	carbon	trading.	This	convergence	on	carbon	markets	as	a	
dominant	paradigm	has	undoubtedly	influenced	corporate	behaviour	in	different	ways.	
In	some	constituencies,	carbon	accounting	and	reporting	has	been	imposed	on	
companies,	for	example	under	the	EU	ETS,	where	annual	reporting	of	verified	carbon	
dioxide	emissions	became	mandatory	for	large	emitters	from	2005.	In	other	
constituencies,	carbon	accounting	and	voluntary	reporting	may	be	driven	by	anticipation	
of	future	carbon	regulation.	Other	influences	may	be	more	subtle:	the	rapid	expansion,	
particularly	since	2006,	in	voluntary	carbon	offsetting	is	an	area	that	would	benefit	from	
further	research	into	corporate	motivations,	stakeholder	influence	and	the	role	of	the	
dominant	regulatory	discourse	in	shaping	voluntary	practice	(see	Hamilton	et	al.,	2010;	
Bumpus	and	Liverman	2008;	Lovell	et	al.,	2009a;	Deegan	and	Blomquist,	2006;	
Mackenzie	and	Ascui,	2009;	Villiers	and	van	Staden,	2006).	Carbon	accounting	has	also	
entered	the	discourse	of	strategy:	measuring	an	organisation’s	‘carbon	footprint’	has	
become	a	widely	accepted	first	step	in	developing	a	corporate	climate	change	strategy	
(Hoffman,	2007;	Lash	and	Wellington,	2007;	PricewaterhouseCoopers,	2007).	
	
The	above	discussion	has	focussed	on	organisations,	particularly	private	sector	
corporations,	as	the	main	subjects	of	social/environmental	carbon	accounting.	However,	
the	notion	of	the	‘carbon	footprint’	descends,	in	part	at	least,	from	the	earlier,	much	
broader,	concept	of	‘ecological	footprint’	as	a	way	of	measuring	and	comparing	the	
totality	of	environmental	impacts	(Rees,	1992;	Wackernagel	and	Rees,	1996).	The	related	
concept	of	a	product	carbon	footprint	owes	a	great	deal	to	the	theory	and	methods	of	
Life	Cycle	Analysis	(LCA	–	for	a	recent	review	see	Finnveden	et	al.,	2009).	LCA	has	
traditionally	been	dominated	by	scientists	rather	than	accountants.	Perhaps	for	this	
reason,	we	find	a	recent	standard	(heavily	derived	from	LCA	practices)	known	as	PAS	
2050	for	carbon	accounting	of	goods	and	services	(BSI,	2008)	specifying	the	use	of	the	
latest	IPCC	figures	for	global	warming	potentials	–	thus	giving	rise	to	discrepancies	
between,	say,	a	company’s	emissions	as	reported	under	the	EU	Emissions	Trading	
Scheme	or	the	WRI/WBCSD	GHG	Protocol	(which	both	follow	the	Kyoto	Protocol	
approach	of	using	1996	IPCC	values)	and	the	emissions	associated	with	the	company’s	
products.	Other	problems	of	comparability	arise	when	a	product	footprint	expressed	as	a	
carbon	label,	e.g.	on	Walker’s	crisps	–	is	compared	against	the	footprint	of	an	alternative	
product	(Carbon	Trust,	2008).	Like	previously	mentioned	national	and	project-level	
carbon	accounting,	LCA	and	corporate	reporting	standards	can	be	seen	as	attempts	to	
define	different	boundaries	and	responsibilities	for	GHG	emissions,	with	overlapping	and	
contested	results.		
	
5 Conclusions	
In	summary,	we	wish	to	draw	attention	to	the	fact	that	carbon	accounting	is	conceptually	
contested,	policy	relevant	and	a	rich	subject	for	research.	Unacknowledged	and	
unresolved	tensions	in	carbon	accounting	can	undermine	confidence	in	climate	science,	
policies,	markets	and	reporting,	thereby	ultimately	discouraging	action	to	mitigate	
climate	change:	making	sense	of	carbon	accounting	presents	an	opportunity	to	make	a	
positive	contribution	to	finding	practical	solutions.		
	
We	have	shown	that	carbon	accounting	is	contested,	meaning	many	different	things	to	
different	people.	Drawing	on	social	science	theories	of	framing,	we	believe	that	carbon	
accounting	can	best	be	understood	as	a	set	of	ongoing	discursive	acts,	each	setting	
boundaries,	defining	terms	and	claiming	ownership	of	the	issue,	leading	to	what	we	have		
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characterised	as	a	jumbled	landscape	created	by	the	collision	between	five	major	frames	
of	reference:	physical,	political,	market-enabling,	financial	and	social/environmental	
modes	of	carbon	accounting.	This	enables	us	to	provide	an	‘unpacked’	definition	of	
carbon	accounting	that	sets	out	and	makes	explicit	the	different	understandings	that	
various	groups	have	of	the	term	(reflecting	different	origins	and	objectives,	as	we	have	
shown	through	our	review	of	each	of	the	five	frames).	
	
We	also	hope	to	have	shown	that	carbon	accounting	is	relevant:	it	is	precisely	the	easily	
overlooked	systems	of	classification,	measurement,	commensuration	and	
communication	that	underpin	society’s	key	responses	to	the	‘super	wicked	problem’	
(Lazarus,	2009)	of	climate	change.	When	carbon	accounting	fails	to	provide	adequately	
comparable	information	on	corporate	emissions,	impacts	and	responses	to	enable	
investors	to	take	appropriate	decisions	(Kolk	et	al.,	2008),	fails	to	incentivise	tropical	
countries	to	reduce	deforestation	(Eliasch,	2008;	Neeff	and	Ascui,	2009),	or	prevents	
investment	in	biomass	carbon	capture	and	storage	because	it	fails	to	recognise	and	
reward	negative	emissions	(Grönkvist	et	al.,	2006),	society	as	a	whole	loses	valuable	
opportunities	to	avoid	or	reduce	the	damage	caused	by	climate	change.	We	believe	that	
making	sense	of	carbon	accounting	and	bringing	knowledge	and	experience	from	
different	communities	together	provides	significant	potential	for	constructive	learning	
and	positive	policy	change.		
	
An	excellent	example	of	how	this	could	be	done	is	the	establishment	by	the	Carbon	
Disclosure	Project	of	the	Climate	Disclosure	Standards	Board	(CDSB),	bringing	together	
several	of	the	communities	of	practice	associated	with	different	carbon	accounting	
frames:	the	Board	includes	stakeholders	familiar	with	social/environmental	and	market-
enabling	carbon	accounting,9	and	the	Technical	Working	Group	comprises	all	of	the	‘Big	
Four’	global	accountancy	firms	and	a	number	of	accounting	professional	bodies,	as	well	
as	climate	scientists	in	an	advisory	role.	The	CDSB	has	released	an	Exposure	Draft	
Reporting	Framework,	deliberately	presented	in	a	form	compatible	with	a	draft	IASB	
standard	and	aimed	at	standardising	disclosure	of	climate	change	policies	and	impacts	in	
mainstream	financial	reports	(Climate	Disclosure	Standards	Board,	2009).	Nevertheless,	
it	appears	there	is	still	room	for	improvement,	as	accounting	standard-setters	are	
notably	absent:	the	Exposure	Draft	states	that	“...the	proposed	Framework	is	not	an	IASB	
standard	or	exposure	draft	and	neither	the	IASB	nor	its	member	bodies	have	been	
consulted	on	the	positions	taken	in	the	proposed	Framework”	(Carbon	Disclosure	
Standards	Board,	2009:	4).	It	remains	to	be	seen	how	this	attempt	to	re-draw	the	
boundaries	of	carbon	accounting	(and	associated	competencies	in	terms	of	who	sets	
standards	and	who	claims	expertise	in	carbon	accounting,	auditing	and	verification)	will	
develop.	Further	research	into	the	process	would	be	useful,	perhaps	building	on	earlier	
work	by	Power	(1991;	1997)	in	relation	to	defining	the	boundaries	and	competencies	of	
environmental	audit.	
	
Finally,	we	hope	to	have	shown	that	carbon	accounting	is	interesting:	that	it	offers	
tremendous	scope	for	further	research.	We	believe	that	it	is	time	to	acknowledge	carbon	
accounting	as	a	new	research	agenda,	worthy	of	investigation	in	itself	(in	the	manner	of	
Burchell	et	al.,	1980),	as	well	as	in	its	manifold	practical	applications.	We	make	a	plea	for	
future	research	to	be	interdisciplinary	and	to	acknowledge	the	multiple	framings	of	
carbon	accounting,	in	order	to	contribute	practical	solutions	that	ultimately	enhance	the	
efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	society’s	response	to	climate	change.		
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1 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 45/212 Protection of global climate for present and 
future generations of mankind. Available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r212.htm 
(accessed 10 September 2009). 
2 Decision 2/CP.3, available at unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf (accessed 29 December 
2009). 
3 According to the legal firm Baker and Mackenzie, authors of the online rulebook available at 
http://cdmrulebook.org/ (accessed 18 December 2009).  
4 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/index.html (accessed 8 January 2010). 
5 See for example the Copenhagen Accord, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf (accessed 8 January 
2010). 
6 Interview conducted as one of a set of 20 interviews with accountants as part of a Nuffield 
Foundation supported research project (see Lovell and Mackenzie, 2011).  
7 See http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/FactSheet.htm and https://www.cdproject.net/en-
US/Results/Pages/overview.aspx (accessed 24 September 2010). 
8 See for example http://www.corporateregister.com/  
9 The Climate Disclosure Standards Board includes, in addition to CDP, CERES (the organisation 
behind the GRI), The Climate Group, The Climate Registry, International Emissions Trading 
Association, World Economic Forum and World Resources Institute (Carbon Disclosure Standards 
Board, 2009). 
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